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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
LINDELL RAY NEWTON, 
Defendant.-Appellant. 
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Draper, u~ 
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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
-v-
LINDELL RAY NEWTON, 
Def end ant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
10638 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sen-
tence for the crime of robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was jointly tried with his co-
defendant before a jury on April 22, 1966, before the 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, then one of the judges of the 
Third Judicial District, sitting by invitation in the 
Seventh Judicial District. Both defendants were 
found guily by a jury verdict signed April 23, 1966, 
of the crime of robbery as charged in the informa-
tion. Appellant was sentenced to be confined to the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period of not 
2 
less than five years nor more than life, as provided 
by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
The key witnesses produced by the State at the 
trial were Leonard K. Jewkes and Williams J. Himes, 
Jr., both patrolmen with the Utah Highway Patrol 
(Tr. 99 and 130). Officer Jewkes testified that on the 
evening of October 8, 1965, he and officer Himes 
were partolling Interstate 70 near Crescent Junc-
tion. The officers observed an automobile travelin0 
in the opposite direction, which failed to dim its 
lights for the car immediately in front of the patrol 
car (Tr. 100). The patrol car turned and followed the 
car and clocked it at a speed in excess of 88 miles 
per hour, 18 miles per hour in excess of the posted 
70 mHes per hour speed limit. The officers stopped 
the automobile (Tr. 101), and the driver was ident-
fied as Sherrill Chestnut, III (Tr. 101, 102). Officer 
Jewkes detected alcohol on Mr. Chestnut's breath 
and decided to administer a field test to determine 
whether the driver was driving under the influence 
of alcohol. Mr. Chestnut failed to hit his heel to his 
toe three times and officer Jewkes placed him under 
arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (Tr. 
102, 133). Thereafter officer Himes searched the in-
terior of the ca.r, and defendant Newton, who had 
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been sleeping in the back seat of the car, awoke (Tr. 
103). In searching the automobile, officer Himes 
found a loaded revolver in the glove compartment. 
Defendant Chestnut stated that the gun belonged 
,o him (Tr. 103). Officer Himes advised Mr. Chestnut 
rhat he would have to cite him for carrying a loaded 
rire arm in the automobile (Tr. 104). After finding that 
Mr. Chestnut had no registration papers or proof 
Jf ownership, radio contact was made with Price, 
LJtah, to determine vvhether Chestnut was wanted 
tor any previous crimes .. A subsequent check was 
made on defendant Newton (Tr. 105). While waiting 
for the response from Price, Utah, the officers de-
cided to search the automobile for further evidence. 
The trunk of the car was searched and three six-
packs of beer and an Air Force overnight bag con-
taining punches, chissels, gloves, a hammer, and a 
glass cutter was found (Tr. 106). It was then that de-
fendant Chestnut produced a pistol and ordered the 
officers to raise their hands (Tr. 107-138). Defendant 
Newton relieved the officers of their side arms (Tr. 
108-138) and the officers were directed to go to a 
fence on the north side of the highway. At this point 
Mr. Newton fired a shot in front of officer Jewkes. 
(Tr. 110-140). When the troopers reached the fence 
Mr. Chestnut took officer Jewkes' wallet containing 
$118.00 while defendant Newton held a gun on the 
officers (Tr. 110-111, 141). The officers were then 
handcuffed to a telephone pole (Tr. 113-114, 143). 
The defendants fled in their automobile, and 
after taking refuge in a truck, were apprehended 
by the police (Tr. 172). When the defendants were 
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apprehended the officers' revc~vers ·1.rere s:i~~ ::. 
their possession rrr. 175). Officer Jewkes' wallet 1:.-~s 
found in the defendan~' s abandcr.ed ai...:tc!r.obEe 
with only $8.00 missing. OEicer Jewkes testified th:'c 
the $8.00 was located ~n the ,_.,.·a.llet. :Ci...:: tha.t the 
$10.00 bill was located amcng so~e fc~:=:ed papers 
and that the $100.00 bill 'N3S located ma ba.ck pocket 
of the wallet (Tr. 117). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. APPELLANT CANNOT RAISE THE ISSCE OF PRE-
TRIAL PUBLICITY FOR THE FIRST TI\1E O~ 
APPEAL. 
B. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT APPELL.\NT WAS 
IN ANY WAY PREJCDICED BY PRETRIAL PCB-
LICITY. 
Appellant argues that he vv-as deprived of a fair 
and impartial trial due to the pi....:blicity he receivec 
prior to the trial. N-::iwhere in the record does it a;: 
pear that appellant !Tioved for a change cf verr...::o 
or that appellant was overlv concerned about local 
prejudices. It is submitted that appellant may not 
raise an issue on appeal that was not raised in the 
trial court. Carson v. Douglas. 12 Utah 2d 424. 35·-
P.2d 462 (1964): Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Com· 
pany. 6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956). 
It is further submitted that there is no showm:J 
that appellant was prejudiced by pretrial pub~1city. 
It is well established that it is not a denial of di..:.e 
process to refuse tc declare a m:strial where t~.:: 
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iuror's who had read news articles concerninQ the 
alleged crime stated that they have not been in-
fluenced by the reports, U. S. v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 
IC.A.N.Y. 1965), cert. den. 384 U. S. 947 (1966), and 
where cautionary instructions had been given. U. S. 
v. Lombardozzi 335 F.2d 414 (C.A.N.Y.) cert. den. 379 
U. S. 914 (1964). In the instant case the trial court in-
quired of every prospective iuror whether they knew 
something about this case and if they did, the, 
-,.,-hether they had formed an opinion concernir:g 
the guilt of the defendants. Every juror indicated 
that no opinion had been formed by them and that 
they felt they could be objective about the issues. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN THE LESSER OFFENSE 
OF ASSAULT, SINCE THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED 
~l~T THE EVIDENCE. 
The appellant contends that the trial court 
erred in refusing to give a requested instruction in 
the claimed lesser included offense of assault. The 
J.ppella.nt had requested such an instruction and an 
exception was duly taken <Tr. 209). 
It is well settled in this state that an instruction 
on a lesser included offense is not required, unless 
the evidence raises the issue for the jury's considera-
tion. It is submitted that even assuming assault, as 
defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-1 (1953), is a lesser 
included offense of rcbbery, the evidence in the in-
stant case did not raise the issue or warrant the jury's 
consideration of an assault. Therefore, it was not 
6 
error for the trial c01irt to refuse to instruct on the 
lesser offense of assault. State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 
215 Pac. 531 (1923); State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263 
279 Pac. 55 (1929); State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 
P.2d 618 (1955). 
In State v. Ferguson, supra at 267, 279 Pac. 56, 
Justice Straup (concurring) noted: 
I concur in the result. I concur in the general 
statement as announced in some of the texts and 
cases that when there is no evidence to support a 
conviction of a lesser offense, a court is not re-
quired to submit it to a jury, and concur in the 
statement in the prevailing opinion that instruc-
tions as to lower grades of a charged offense, when 
embraced and included therein, should be given 
when warranted by evidence. 
In State v. Mitchell, supra, at 3 Utah 2d 76, 278 
P.2d, Justice Crockett (concurring) stated: 
I agree that under the circumstances of this 
case it was not prejudicial error for the court to fail 
to instruct on lesser included offenses. However, 
under some circumstances where the evidence 
would plainly indicate that the jury should properly 
consider lesser offenses, I think it might be error for 
the trial court not to instruct with respect to them, 
even if counsel made no request. 
Certainly this is not support for appellant's prop-
osition that it is the duty of the trial court to instruct 
the jury as to every lesser, included offense. 
Most recently in State v. Dodge. 18 Utah 2d 63 
at 64, 415 P.2d 212 at 213 (1967) where the defendant 
was apprehended inside a building while attempt-
7 
ing to peel a safe, this court said of appellants' re-
quested instruction on the lesser offense of unlaw-
ful entry: 
The facts indisputably show he attempting to peel 
the safe. The jury would have been composed of un-
reasonable men had it even considere dthat the de-
fendant had "unlawfully entered" for the altruis-
tric "intent to damage property or to injure a per-
son or annoy the peace and quite of any occupant 
therein." The trial court also would have been an 
unreasonable person had he given such an instruc-
tion. 
Respondent submits that it is not error for the 
trial court to refuse to instruct the jury as to lesser 
offenses included in the charge when the evidence 
shows that the defendants, if guilty at all are guilty 
of the offense charged. People v. Ray, 162 Cal. 
App.2d 308, 328 P.2d 219 (1958). 
Since appellant concedes that the crime of rob-
bery might occur without using a deadly weapon, it 
is apparent that assault with a deadly weapon is not 
a necessary included offense in the crime of robbery 
as assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of 
a separate fact not necessarily included in the crime 
of robbery and the lesser offense of assault is not 
embraced within the legal definition of robbery. 
See State v. Rohletter, 108 Utah 452, 160 P.2d 963 
(1945). 
Appellant argues that since it is the natural 
tendency of a jury to convict an accused who has 
conducted himself "somewhat improperly" where 
the jury is given the choice of either acquitting or 
8 
convicting, the trial court should instruct the jury in 
fenses. 
Utah Code Ann.~ 76-1-8 (1953) charges the court 
with the duty to pass sentence and impose the pun-
ishment prescribed. It is submitted that in allowing 
the jury to consider lesser included offenses when 
not warranted by the evidence, the jury would be 
invited to reach a com promise verdict, 53 Am. J ur. 
§ 789 (1945) and it would have the effect of allowinq 
the jury to determine the punishment of the ac-
cused. As it is not the function of the jury to de-
termine punishment, the jury should not be given 
the power to convict of lesser offenses when not 
raised by the evidence. 
It is further submitted that even if the officers 
were engaged in an unlawful arrest, appellant 
would not be excused or justified in committing 
robbery. See Hardeman v. State. 14 Ala. App. 35, 70 
So. 979 (1916). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY CONCERNING BURG-
LAR TOOLS DISCOVERED AS THE RESULT OF A 
LAWFUL SEARCH. 
It is submitted that the search of the automobile 
was a ]awful search incident to arrest. When the car 
in which appellant was riding was stopped, a mis-
demeanor had been committed in the officers pres-
ence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 4 !-6-46(2) (1960) provides that 
9 
the speed in excess of the limits shall be prima facie 
evidence that the speed is unlawful. 
Since the driver of the automobile in which Mr. 
Newton was riding was traveling in excess of the 
posted speed limit, the above statute was violated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1960) expressly required 
officers Himes and Jewkes to stop the vehicle and in 
so doing effect the driver's arrest. Further, Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1960) makes it a misdemeanor 
for a person under the influence of alcohol to drive 
or be in control of a vehicle within the state. 
The restraint under these circumstances was a 
lawful one and the search made pursuant to the law-
ful arrest was legal. United States v. Rabinowitz. 339 
U.S. 56 ( 1950). 
It is submitted that the testimony concerning 
the search of the automobile and discovery of the 
bag conaining punches, chissels, gloves, a hammer, 
and a glass cutter was part of the res gestae of the 
crime and the trial court had discretion to allow testi-
mony concerning events leading up to robbery. See 
Balle v. Smith 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SEPA-
RATE TRIALS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-6 (1953) provides: 
When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense, whether felony or mis-
10 
demeanor, they shall be tried jointly, unless the 
court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecut-
ing attorney or any defendant orders separate trials, 
This court has approved the above cited statute 
in State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 
(1960) wherein it held that it is within the discretion 
of the court to order separate trials where two or 
more defendants are jointly charged with any of-
fense. 
It is well established that one aiding and abet-
ting others in the commission of the crime of first 
degree robbery is guilty as a principal, regardless 
of the acts committed by him personally. 
In State v. Jones. 45 Hawaii 246, 365 P.2d 460 
(1961) the court held that where a person with knowl-
edge of the unlawful intent of companions stood by 
with gun in hand and acquiesced while his com-
panions committed robbery, he could be indicted 
and convicted as a principal. 
It is submitted that where appellant held a gun 
on both officers while his companion robbed officer 
Jewkes of his wallet, his intent is clearly evidenced 
by his acts. No testimony of Sherrill Chestnut under 
this circumstance could establish that appellant did 
not intend to aid ~nd abet his companion in robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant can not raise the issue of pretrial 
publicity for the first time on appeal. 
11 
As evidence did not raise the issue of lesser 
included offenses, and the trial court correctly re-
fused to gra.nt appellant's requested instruction 
thereon. 
The search of the automobile in which appellant 
was riding was incident to a lawful arrest and there-
fore legal. The evidence so obtained was therefore 
legal and part of the res gestae of the crime and the 
testimony concerning the burglar tools was there-
fore admissible. 
The trial court correctly denied appellants' mo-
tion for separate trials as no defense could be raised 
at separate trial which could not have been raised 
at a trial where defendants were tried together. Ap-
pellant has not demonstrated wherein he was prej-
udiced. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
